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Shortly after his election, President Joe Biden announced a number of issues he
would tackle during his first days in office. Amongst others, this included reversing
the effects of what Richard Haass, president of the US Council on Foreign Relations
thinktank, described as Trump’s “Withdrawal Doctrine” – pulling the US out of a
whole range of international treaties. Trump’s reluctance towards instruments of
international cooperation and his (threat of) withdrawal from international treaties
was a recurring theme throughout his presidency – beginning with the “unsigning”
of the Trans-Pacific Partnership only days after his inauguration and ending with
the denunciation of the Open Skies Treaty taking effect only days after this year’s
presidential election.
In re-establishing international treaty relations, Biden’s administration will face
constitutional (see, e.g. here and here) and international law issues. This post aims
to provide an overview of the relevant international treaty law aspects. In doing so,
it differentiates between withdrawals for which notification was given and those that
have already become effective. Paradoxically, on his way back to multilateralism,
Biden can draw on treaty law questions and practice surrounding Brexit.
A unilateral right of revocation
Where States may terminate a treaty – be it based on a respective treaty provision
or general treaty law – such termination usually does not take effect immediately.
Instead, the final clauses of treaties (usually) and treaty law generally provide for a
period of at least a few months between notification and actual withdrawal. A case
in point is Trump’s denunciation of the WHO Constitution. The US ratified the WHO
Constitution based on an understanding that it could terminate its membership on
a one-year notice. Thus, while the US formally declared its intention to withdraw on
July 6, 2020, this will only take effect on July 6, 2021. The question is whether this
allows Biden to reverse Trump’s decision under international law unilaterally, i.e.
without the consent of the other State parties.
Such a unilateral right of revocation could follow from Article 68 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) which provides that a notification of
termination (as provided for in Article 67(2) VCLT) “may be revoked at any time
before it takes effect”. While the US is not a party to the VCLT, the possibility of
revocation has been practiced by the US before and can, arguably, be considered
as customary international law. In the international community, there is disagreement
as to when a notification of revocation “takes effect”. Inferences can be drawn from
the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) 2018 Wightman judgement concerning the
possibility of a unilateral revocation of UK’s notice of withdrawal from the EU.
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An initially discussed (p 95) and, partly, still promoted (pp 845 ff) view is to
differentiate between when the notification produces a (non-legal) effect and
the actual (legal) effect of ending the treaty’s binding force. Based on such a
differentiation, as soon as the other treaty parties start undertaking preparatory
measures in anticipation of the withdrawal (i.e. the notification has produced an
effect), a revocation would only be possible on a consensual basis.
Relying on a good faith reading, the idea behind this differentiation is that the
remaining treaty parties cannot be expected to wait with their preparations until
termination takes effect or to reverse all preparations if the withdrawing State
changes its mind last minute. In Wightman, the EU Council and Commission,
moreover, pointed to a risk of circumvention and abuse (para 38 ff.). A unilateral
perpetual right of revocation would allow the withdrawing Member State to
repeatedly revoke and then re-trigger its Article 50 TEU notification avoiding the time
limits of Article 50 and creating extra negotiation leverage.
However, judging from its 1966 commentaries, the International Law Commission
seems to have ultimately decided against such differentiation. The effect of a
notification of withdrawal being the termination of the treaty relationship at a
specified date, recognizing prior effectiveness of the notification itself did not appear
to make sense (p 264). And although it recognized the potential need for States to
prepare for the withdrawal of a treaty partner, “it concluded that the considerations
militating in favour of encouraging the revocation of notices and instruments of
denunciation, termination, etc. are so strong that the general rule should admit a
general freedom to do so prior to the taking effect of the notice or instrument” (p
264). Likewise, the ECJ in Wightman referred to the “clear and unconditional
terms” (para 71) of Article 68 VCLT to confirm its finding of a unilateral right to
revoke an Article 50 TEU notification until membership has terminated.
Therefore, where the US has denounced a treaty, but such denunciation has not yet
taken effect, Biden remains free under international law to unilaterally revoke the
notification of withdrawal.
The re-ratification of treaties
It gets more complicated where withdrawals have already become effective. Here,
the Biden administration will have to revive their treaty relations through the re-
conclusion of (new) agreements. In doing so, it will have to differentiate between
bilateral and multilateral treaties.
Bilateral Treaties
Whilst the withdrawal from multilateral agreements regularly attracted more
international attention, the suspension and termination of three bilateral agreements
with Hong Kong shows that bilateral treaties also fell “victim” to Trump’s policy
approach. The difficulty concerning bilateral treaties is that the effect of one party’s
denunciation is, logically, the termination of the treaty. Thus, if Biden has an interest
in reviving these treaty relationships, he must conclude new treaties. In doing so, his
administration could take a similar route as the UK post-Brexit.
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Upon withdrawal from the EU, the UK considered that treaty relations with third
States previously enjoyed as a Member State would no longer apply to it. Wanting to
preserve these treaties but lacking the time and workforce to re-negotiate them, the
UK resorted to a practice of “roll-overs”, concluding treaties that simply reproduce
the agreements between the EU and third States. An example is the (ten articles
long) UK-Chile Association Agreement. Subject to minor technical adaptions,
“[t]he provisions of the EU-Chile Agreement […] in effect immediately before they
cease to apply to the United Kingdom are incorporated into and made part of this
Agreement” (Article 3). To avoid gaps, Article 10 additionally provides for provisional
application pending its entry into force.
Should Biden be interested in re-viving bilateral treaties such as those with Hong
Kong, treaty law does not prevent the incorporation of terminated treaties into
new agreements. A practice of incorporation would not only spare the Biden
administration from conducting time-consuming re-negotiations or copy-pasting
terminated treaties (which again bears the risk of text re-opening). Where several
agreements with one State are affected – as in the case of Hong Kong – a single
agreement would suffice to incorporate several terminated treaties. Agreeing on the
provisional application of the “incorporation treaties” would re-establish the treaty
relations even faster.
Multilateral Treaties
The advantage of multilateral treaties is that withdrawal by one State generally does
not affect the treaty as such (Article 70(2) VCLT). In contrast to “just” concluding
new (or “incorporation”) agreements, re-establishing the multilateral treaty relations,
however, requires the observance of the accession procedure. In the case of the
Paris Agreement, this is fairly simple: Any party to the UN Framework Convention
on Climate Change (which the US never left) may accede by means of depositing
a respective instrument. As accession procedures vary on a case-by-case basis,
two other examples of treaties from which Trump withdrew will be given to illustrate
where re-accession may cause some interpretational issues.
The UNESCO Convention is an open treaty, meaning that any State can accede.
The only condition for accession – in addition to the deposition of an instrument of
acceptance – is signature (Article XV(2)). Here, one could argue that by withdrawing
from the Convention, Trump also withdrew the 1946 signature. On the other hand,
even “unsigning” a treaty does not remove the physical signature once placed under
the treaty. Thus, depositing a new instrument of acceptance could suffice.
In contrast to the UNESCO Convention, the Open Skies Treaty is closed, allowing
accession only to a list of nine States excluding the US (Article XVII(3)). Thus, in
principle, the US would have to apply for accession via the depositary who would
refer the application to the Open Skies Consultative Commission for consideration.
Alternatively, Article XVII(1) provides for the ratification by the original “State
Parties”. As one of those original parties, the US could, thus, argue that this also
encompasses an implicit right to re-ratification.
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More elaborate accession procedures have the potential of prolongig the process of
re-joining multilateral treaty regimes. Where interpretational questions arise, these
can, however, be resolved with the goodwill of all involved parties.
Outlook
What Jack Goldsmith predicted as part of an “onslaught on international law and
institutions” in 2017 – the withdrawal from international treaties and institutions –
has come true during Trump’s four years in office. While his “Withdrawal Doctrine”
put a question mark behind the notion of multilateralism, Biden has already started
reversing this trend, announcing the US’ return to the Paris Agreement and the
WHO. As shown in this post, treaty law provides the new administration with the
means to do this.
At the same time, the extent of Biden’s return to international treaty relations remains
to be seen. Return to compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) under the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
appears at least questionable. Other treaties, such as the US-Iran Treaty of Amity on
which Iran successfully based a claim against the US sanctions before the ICJ will
most certainly remain buried.
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